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Should Automakers Be
Responsible for Accidents?
Automaker enterprise liability would have useful incentives that
driver liability law misses.

M

✒ BY KYLE D. LOGUE

otor vehicles are among the most
dangerous products sold anywhere.
Automobiles pose a larger risk of accidental death than any other product,
except perhaps opioids. Annual autocrash deaths in the United States
have not been below 30,000 since the
1940s, reaching a recent peak of roughly 40,000 in 2016.
And the social cost of auto crashes goes beyond deaths. Autoaccident victims who survive often incur extraordinary medical
expenses. Those crash victims whose injuries render them unable
to work experience lost income. Auto accidents also cause nontrivial amounts of property damage—mostly to the automobiles
themselves, but also to highways, bridges, or other elements of
the transportation infrastructure. Finally, serious motor vehicle
accidents often cause severe noneconomic injuries—that is, “pain
and suffering.” According to some estimates, such noneconomic
harms amount to more than twice the magnitude of the aggregate
economic damages caused by auto accidents.
All of this may be about to change. According to many autoindustry experts, the eventual transition to driverless vehicles
will drastically lower the economic and noneconomic costs of
auto accidents.
Why might this be so? Humans are bad drivers. People have
bad judgment, slow reflexes, inadequate skills, and short attention spans. They drive too fast. They drive while intoxicated or
sleepy or distracted. According to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, roughly 94% of auto accidents today are
attributable to “driver error.”
The hope is that computers can do better. Fully driverless
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vehicles, sometimes referred to within the industry as “Level 5s”
to distinguish them from vehicles with levels of partial autonomy,
would not suffer from the problems that plague human decisionmaking in the driving context. These vehicles thus promise to be
substantially safer than the human-driven alternative.
How should the automobile tort/insurance regime be redesigned to take into account the emergence of driverless vehicles?
I propose to replace our current auto tort regime (including auto
products liability law, driver-based negligence claims, and auto nofault regimes) with a single comprehensive automaker enterprise
liability system. This new regime would apply not only to Level 5s,
but to all automobiles made and sold to be driven on public roads.
My basic argument is that while current negligence-based auto
liability rules could in theory work to provide optimal accidentavoidance incentives, in practice they do not. The current system
requires courts and drivers to evaluate benefit–cost tradeoffs
they are not equipped to make. Also under the current system,
much of auto-accident costs are offloaded onto medical and dis-
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ability insurers or taxpayers. By contrast, under an automaker
enterprise liability system, responsibility for those costs would
be placed on the parties in the best position to reduce and insure
them: vehicle manufacturers. In addition, automakers would be
induced to charge enough for cars to fully internalize the costs of
automobile accidents. Further, if auto-insurance contracts—and
auto-insurance premium adjustments—could be deployed to
improve driving habits, auto manufacturers would be induced to
coordinate with auto insurers to achieve these deterrence gains.
Moreover, to the extent that Level 5s reduce the cost of accidents,
they would be cheaper to purchase than conventional vehicles,
which would provide a natural subsidy to encourage (and potentially accelerate) their deployment.
EVALUATING THE DETERRENCE IMPLICATIONS
OF CURRENT AUTO TORT LAW

Existing automaker liability law is primarily a negligence-based
regime. Under current law in most U.S. jurisdictions, individuals who suffer harm caused in an automobile crash can recover
from the automaker in tort if they can prove that the harm
resulted from negligence (or a lack of reasonable care) on the
part of the automaker in designing or constructing the vehicle.
Alternatively, auto accident victims can invoke modern product
liability doctrine and argue that a “defect” in the vehicle’s design,
manufacturing process, or warnings caused the harm. And in
most jurisdictions, the definition of a product defect likewise
requires a showing of negligence.
A negligence-based liability rule would induce automakers
to take efficient care, provided the following two assumptions
are true:
■■ Automakers
■■

are aware of the law and respond rationally to it.
Courts perform a thorough and accurate benefit–cost
analysis in their determinations regarding what constitutes
automaker negligence or what counts as a design defect.

Under those assumptions, the negligence-based regime would
incentivize efficient automaker care levels—i.e., investments in
crash–risk reduction—because automakers would avoid negligence-based liability if they make all cost-justified design and
warning changes.
A negligence-based automaker liability regime can also create incentives for efficient driver care-levels. A negligence-based
regime would leave accident costs on victims and their insurers
if the automaker is not negligent. That would induce drivers to
drive carefully so as to minimize their own risk of uncompensated accident losses. Thus, an efficiently and accurately applied
negligence-based automaker liability rule can produce efficient
incentives for both automakers and drivers to take care to avoid
auto accidents.
There are obvious problems with this rosy picture, however.
First, consider the effects on automaker care levels if we relax
the assumption that courts accurately apply negligence-based
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standards. If judges and juries are not very good at doing the
complex and information-intensive analysis, the outcomes of
courts’ negligence determinations become highly uncertain. This
can produce incentives for automakers to both over-invest and
under-invest in auto safety. The incentive to over-invest can arise
when manufacturers expect courts to set the standard of reasonable care (or a non-defective design) inefficiently high. The
incentive to under-invest can arise if courts rely too much on
custom within the industry as their source for what constitutes
reasonable care because industry custom can lag what is a truly
efficient level of safety.
A second problem with a negligence-based auto products
liability regime has to do with driver care levels. For a negligencebased regime to efficiently incentivize drivers to drive carefully, the
tort system must impose on drivers the risk of accidents that are
not cost-justifiably preventable by the manufacturer. But drivers
simply are not aware of the tort law rules that apply to them or the
product liability rules that apply to automakers. Moreover, even
when drivers do know about accident risks and legal rules, they
may not respond rationally to that information or may externalize
those risks to insurance companies. Because of these facts, the
ability of a negligence-based auto products liability regime to
optimize driver care levels is substantially undermined. Legally
imposing costs on drivers would not—or at least may not—have
the desired deterrence effect on driver care levels.
The final deterrence problem with a negligence-based auto
products liability regime would exist even if judges and juries were
good (accurate and unbiased) at applying benefit–cost standards.
In fact, this problem results because automakers would expect
accurate application of the negligence-based rules. The problem
involves the effect of a negligence-based automaker liability rule
on the number of vehicles sold or, in the language of deterrence,
the effect on automaker “activity levels.” Even an efficiently safe
car (one with no defects whatsoever) that is driven carefully by its
human or algorithmic driver poses some residual risk of crashing.
This residual risk will tend to be ignored or externalized by automakers under a negligence-based product liability regime because
automakers are not liable for them under a negligence liability
standard. The result is that the number of cars sold may be higher
than the social-welfare-maximizing level, even ignoring the effect
of automobile emissions on the environment, because the price of
vehicles does not include this cost of unpreventable auto accidents.
To summarize, under our current negligence-based automaker
liability regime, there are reasons to be concerned that automaker
and driver care levels may be too low and activity levels too high.
Driver liability law / In a majority of U.S. states, if someone is
injured or suffers property damage as a result of a driver’s negligent operation of an automobile rather than as a result of
automaker negligence, the victim may recover from the negligent
driver under standard common-law principles of tort. The victim must demonstrate that the harm to her was a result of the

driver’s failure to do something that a reasonable driver would
have done under the circumstances, or the driver’s doing something that a reasonable driver under the circumstances would
not have done.
Negligence-based driver liability law can have beneficial deterrence effects on driver care levels (that is, how safely people drive)
if we make the following assumptions:
Drivers are well informed about accident risks (and how
their behavioral changes affect those accident risks).
■■ Drivers are well-informed about the rules of tort law.
■■ Drivers internalize those risks (rather than externalize them
to insurers, for example).
■■ Drivers process the information about those risks rationally
(without any systematic cognitive biases).
■■ Courts are good at applying benefit-cost-type negligencebased liability rules.
■■

If all of these assumptions are true, drivers would have adequate
incentive to drive with efficient care in terms of driving speed,
safe braking and passing practices, smart-phone usage (or nonusage), and the like. This is so because, by taking efficient care
in driving, drivers would avoid liability for the accidents that
nevertheless occur.
The assumptions listed above almost certainly do not hold in
the real world. While drivers may be generally aware of the broad
outlines of the driver liability regime in their state (whether it is
fault-based or no-fault), they likely do not understand what the
precise implications of that fact are on their chances of being
found liable in court for unsafe driving. What’s more, the average driver, while generally and vaguely cognizant of the risks of
driving, is almost certainly uneducated about the precise levels
of risk associated with various aspects of driving—for example,
precisely how much the chance of a crash is increased by texting
while driving or changing lanes abruptly with no signal. In fact,
there is a good chance that most drivers underestimate those risks.
Thus, a negligence-based driver liability regime, which relies on
assumptions of informed and rational drivers to produce optimal
driver care levels, may not produce the deterrence benefits that
are predicted by deterrence theory.
How is this pessimistic picture of driver liability law as a system
of incentivizing good driving changed by the presence of auto
insurance? The answer is complicated. On one hand, automobile
insurance has the potential to correct some of these deterrencerelated problems. Auto insurers are, unlike most drivers, extremely
well-informed about the intricacies of accident law. They employ
teams of lawyers whose job is to understand how driver liability
laws in each state affect the liability risks of their customers.
Indeed, their profitability and their survival as going concerns
depend on this expert understanding of the auto liability laws of
all sorts. In addition, auto insurers have unparalleled access to
enormous amounts of detailed information regarding the crashrisk characteristics of millions of drivers and automobiles. This
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is the result of decades of experience providing auto insurance
coverage to hundreds of millions of drivers and vehicles, which
in turn means pricing millions of auto insurance policies and
adjusting millions of auto-crash claims over the years. No other
institution or organization has the same amount of driver-specific
and automobile-specific data as the auto insurance industry.
In addition, recent innovations in “telematics” (which combines telecommunications, data science, and automotive technology) have increased auto insurers’ ability to gather and analyze
risk-relevant driver and vehicle data. With this new and emerging technology, not only do insurers have access to information
regarding how drivers’ past auto-claims and traffic-ticket histories
affect their riskiness as drivers, they also have the ability to gather
information on the effects of a range of specific driving behaviors
on auto-crash risks. For example, a number of insurers currently
gather information about drivers’ braking, acceleration, speeding, turning, and cornering behaviors. Once these driver-specific
data are combined with data gathered by insurers and others
(including NHTSA) about what factors cause auto accidents
generally, it becomes possible for auto insurers to link specific
driving behaviors of particular drivers with premium discounts.
All of this information is to varying degrees already being taken
into account by many auto insurance companies in the pricing of
their insurance policies. For example, policy discounts are offered
to drivers with good safety records as well as for vehicles with
particular safety features. In addition, insurers are now offering
discounts if drivers will improve their driving ability—for example,
if they will take defensive driving classes. Because of the telematics revolution, auto insurers are even able to adjust premiums
on the basis of the specific driving behavior of individual drivers.
For example, some insurers give discounts for a range of drivercare-level factors such as wearing seatbelts, driving at moderate
speeds, limiting late night trips, and avoiding aggressive braking.
Also, the advances in telematics have made “pay as you go” auto
insurance, under which premiums are a function of the number
of miles driven, more accurate—and thus more prevalent—than
ever before. Driving-behavior-sensitive auto insurance premiums—
which take into account both good and bad driving choices (i.e.,
driver care levels) and, critically, the number of miles driven (i.e.,
driver activity levels)—would incentivize risk-reducing driving
behavior more than even the most sophisticated government
regulator could hope to do.
But here is the problem: under current law and existing market
conditions, auto insurers do not have strong incentives to make
full use of their comparative advantage at gathering risk-relevant
information and pricing their insurance on the basis of that information. The reason is that the amount of coverage currently being
provided by auto insurers represents only a fraction (in many cases
a small fraction) of the total risks of auto crashes. This is true of
first-party auto insurance coverage, which tends to cover only a
fraction of the accident risks that any driver faces. It is also true of
auto liability coverage because the mandatory minimum amounts
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in most states are far less than the maximum harm threatened by
an auto accident that results in even one serious injury or death.
As a result, many of the costs of auto accidents are currently
being externalized to non-auto first-party health and disability
insurers who—unlike auto insurers in the telematics age—do not
tailor premiums at all based on their insureds’ driving decisions.
(To the extent such coverage is provided through government
programs funded by tax dollars, there is obviously no premium
being charged at all.) Thus, even to the extent that auto insurers
do attempt to charge individualized, behavior- and risk-adjusted
auto insurance rates (which, as I noted above, they are increasingly trying to do), this incentive is undermined by the fact that
auto insurers cover only a fraction of the risks of auto accidents.
There are important ways, however, in which the allocation of
auto-accident risks to non-auto first-party insurers has cost-reducing advantages. This may seem incongruous with the argument in
the previous paragraph, but it is not. While auto insurers are in
a good position, through premium discounts, to help optimize
driver care and activity levels, auto insurers are not necessarily in
a good position to minimize some other costs associated with
providing insurance benefits. For example, primary health care
coverage provided through auto insurance companies is almost
certainly much more expensive than primary health care provided
through regular non-auto, first-party health insurers. Although
auto insurers, in a sense, specialize increasingly in reducing driver
ex-ante moral hazard, it is non-auto health insurance companies
who specialize in reducing ex-post medical moral hazard—that is,
excessive or wasteful use of the health care system. My point here
is only that the current division of auto-accident costs, allocating
so little to auto insurers, may be non-optimal given auto insurers’
potential ability to incentivize better (and less) driving.
To summarize, because of drivers’ lack of accident-risk information and understanding of auto tort law and their susceptibility to cognitive biases, and because of the presence of costexternalizing private and public insurance coverage for auto-crash
risks, there is reason to doubt that the current negligence-based
auto tort laws—automaker liability laws as well as driver liability
laws—work to optimize driver care and activity levels.
THE AUTOMAKER ENTERPRISE
LIABILITY ALTERNATIVE

As an alternative to our current negligence-based auto tort regime,
consider the possibility of a comprehensive automaker enterprise
liability regime. Under such a regime, anyone who suffers a physical injury or property damage in an automobile accident would be
entitled to recover compensation for the losses sustained as result
of the accident from the manufacturer of the vehicle. Accident
victims would not be required to show negligence on the part of
the manufacturer. Nor would they have to prove that the automobiles, or any of the warnings or instructions accompanying the
automobiles, are in any way defective or unreasonably dangerous.
Crash victims would need to prove only that the harms for which
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they seek compensation “arose out of the use of” a vehicle that was
designed and built by the manufacturer from whom compensation is sought. Each automaker would be financially responsible
for the losses resulting from any crash arising out of the use of
that automaker’s vehicles.
Liability under an enterprise liability regime, however, would
not necessarily be limited to auto manufacturers. Liability could
also be extended to a range of other enterprises that fall within
the design, production, sale, and distribution chain of any given
vehicle. The allocation of responsibility among those enterprises,
however, would presumably be determined by contracts among
the various counter-parties. Those contracts should be enforced
so long as the cost of auto accidents is not allocated to parties
who are insolvent or judgment-proof.
The types and amount of compensation recoverable under an
automaker enterprise liability regime would probably be limited
to economic losses—medical expenses, lost income, and property
damage. The dearth of pain-and-suffering insurance observed
in the marketplace could suggest that limiting compensation to
economic losses would be consistent with consumer preferences.
And, in any event, not providing compensation for noneconomic
harms is a common and reasonable political compromise for
alternative compensation regimes.
The compensation regime I am imagining is a comprehensive
automaker enterprise liability regime. In other words, it would
apply to all automobiles sold after the effective date of the enacting legislation, whether driven by humans, computer algorithms,
or any combination of the two. One result of the adoption of a
comprehensive automaker enterprise liability regime would be
an increase in the price of most newly purchased automobiles
relative to vehicles purchased before the effective date of the
enacting legislation. This would happen because the cost of auto
accidents that had been hidden in non-auto first-party medical
insurance coverage prior to the enterprise liability regime would
be brought into the open through increases in automobile and
auto-insurance prices.
Theoretical deterrence benefits /

Under a comprehensive automaker enterprise liability regime, because automakers would
be responsible for all of the economic costs of auto accidents
associated with their vehicles, they would be forced to internalize those costs. As a result, there would be beneficial deterrence
consequences for automaker and, potentially, driver care and
activity levels.
First and most obviously, automakers would have a strong legal
and financial incentive to develop and implement cost-justified
auto-safety innovations, whatever those might be. That is, if an
automaker determined that there was some new brake design
(such as a new computer-assisted automatic braking system) or
some new guided cruise control mechanism that would reduce
overall accident costs relative to its costs of development and
implementation, then enterprise liability would reward them for

implementing those innovations and punish them for not doing
so. In addition, there would be no incentive to stick with existing
industry customs or consumer expectations if such customs or
expectations were lagging behind proven safety innovations. And
there would be no incentive to over-invest in safety features that
are likely to impress a court or jury in a negligence-based lawsuit
(such as a design defect lawsuit) but that, in actuality, provide
less additional accident-risk reduction than they cost to produce.
Second, enterprise liability would force the price of automobiles to reflect the full expected costs of auto accidents. That
cost internalization, in turn, could result in a scale of automotive manufacturing and sales that would be closer to the social
optimum than is currently the case because drivers would—in
deciding whether to purchase a vehicle—be more likely to consider
something closer to the full social costs of that decision. In other
words, auto enterprise liability could push us in the direction
of optimal manufacturer activity levels—the optimal number of
vehicles being sold. If that were to happen, it would be a clear
improvement—in terms of overall efficiency—over the existing
negligence-based automaker liability regime.
What would the implications of auto enterprise liability be for
fully driverless vehicles? If Level 5s have lower expected accident
costs relative to human-driven vehicles, then they would also have
a substantially lower enterprise liability “tax” relative to humandriven vehicles (including perhaps partially driverless vehicles)
made and produced after the new regime is adopted. Thus, the
adoption of a comprehensive automaker liability regime would,
under present assumptions, strongly incentivize and reward
auto manufacturers to proceed, as quickly as is feasible, with the
development and distribution of Level 5s.
If an enterprise liability regime is likely to have deterrence
benefits on the automaker side, what about its deterrence effects
on driver behavior? First, enterprise liability would create strong
legal and financial incentives for automakers to develop and adopt
the most cost-effective ways of warning drivers about crash risks
and of instructing drivers about how best to avoid certain types of
accidents. This effect flows from the fact that enterprise liability
makes automakers responsible for all of the economic costs of
their vehicles’ accidents. If an automaker could actually reduce
the frequency or severity of accidents in its vehicles by altering
the wording, design, or placement of warnings or instructions,
it would have an incentive to do so. On the other hand, if some
new or revised warning would be more likely to confuse or annoy
drivers than to educate them, the automaker would be incentivized under enterprise liability not to add that sort of unhelpful
warning—even if it would have gotten the automaker “off the
hook” under a more traditional negligence-based warning-defect
standard. Automakers would do whatever works best to reduce
accident costs. Thus, in the transition to Level 5s, automakers
would be incentivized to warn and instruct optimally regarding
both the risks and the appropriate uses of intermediate driverless
technology such as guided cruise control.
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In addition, enterprise liability could incentivize automakers to restructure the ways that automobiles are insured and
sold in order to improve driver care and activity levels. Under an
enterprise-liability regime, automakers would have an incentive to
shift contractually much of the expected costs of auto accidents
to auto insurers. This somewhat counterintuitive result flows
from the fact that auto insurers have a comparative advantage
with respect to monitoring and regulating driver care and activity
levels. If automakers could get auto insurers to take on somewhat
more of the risk of auto accidents, the insurers would have a
strong incentive to help drivers reduce expected accident costs.
That is, because of competition for customers in the insurance
industry, auto insurers would be incentivized to use the tools
at their disposal—including individualized, driving-behaviorsensitive, risk-adjusted insurance premiums—in ways that would
tend to encourage better driving habits and perhaps less driving,
especially by high-risk drivers.
What does this mean for how auto insurance would be sold?
Auto insurance under an enterprise liability regime might be
sold in the same way it is today. An individual auto purchaser, in
other words, might pay the automaker for the vehicle itself and
then purchase a separate auto insurance policy at the same time
from a separate auto insurance company. However, given that
automakers ultimately would be responsible legally for the autoaccident losses paid by the auto insurers, there would be strong
incentives for contractual coordination between automakers
and auto insurers. Individual auto manufacturers might even be
induced to partner with particular auto insurers in an effort to
offer the best, most competitively priced combined product of
vehicle and vehicle-insurance coverage.
Another way that enterprise liability could improve driver
care and activity levels is through its effect on how automobiles
are sold. For example, the introduction of an enterprise liability
regime might push the automotive industry in the direction
of lease transactions rather than outright sales because leasing
would make it easier for automakers to enforce the terms of the
auto insurance policies sold by an insurer that is contractually
partnered with the automaker. Under a lease arrangement, for
example, if a driver became uninsurable (because of bad driving
behavior and/or increased claim payouts) or if the driver simply
stopped paying her premiums, there might be a provision in the
lease empowering the automaker to reclaim the vehicle.
In addition to favoring leasehold arrangements, the introduction of enterprise liability might create market pressure on auto
manufacturers to sell vehicles to commercial purchasers rather
than individual consumers. These commercial purchasers, in turn,
would either lease the vehicles to individual drivers or perhaps
make them available through ride-share arrangements. Automakers would be incentivized to choose commercial purchasers who
are financially responsible and would be incentivized to purchase
efficient auto insurance contracts to cover the enterprise liability
payouts. Such a trend toward commercial fleets would be con-
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sistent with already existing market trends toward ride-sharing
companies.
I am not suggesting that comprehensive automaker enterprise
liability would necessarily result in auto-lease arrangements
replacing individual sales or ride-sharing replacing driving. Rather,
once automakers are made legally responsible for the cost of auto
accidents (or for most of those costs), they will have an incentive
(and the ability) to structure automobile distribution markets in
ways that are more efficient.
CAVEATS, CONCERNS, AND CONCLUSIONS

This description of an automaker enterprise liability regime is
only a rough outline of an idea, a jumping-off point for further
discussion. The actual design of such a program would require
empirical research into a range of topics, including whether shifting to enterprise liability would actually, and not just theoretically, produce substantial deterrence benefits.
Among the questions to be answered would be these:
Under any real-world version of an automaker enterprise
liability regime, how long would automakers’ responsibility
for insuring their vehicles remain in effect? Would it be for
the useful life of the vehicle or for some period of time—say,
10 years? If for some period of time, who would be responsible for covering the accidents arising out of the later use of
the vehicle?
■■ What would the precise relationship be between an automaker enterprise liability regime and state mandatory
insurance/financial responsibility laws? Presumably, rescission of coverage by the insurer because of excessive accident
experience or the failure to pay premiums would result in
a suspension of driving privileges, but how would that be
enforced?
■■ Furthermore, if an auto enterprise liability regime were
adopted, would all vehicles manufactured and sold before
a given date be exempt? Or would older vehicles made
before the new law goes into effect be transitioned into the
new regime over time? If older vehicles were fully exempted
from the new regime, how would we deal with the resulting potentially large price differential between new vehicles
(which would be priced with full accident costs internalized
into the purchase price) and used vehicles (which would not
be)? What role could increased mandatory minimum levels
of auto insurance play in assisting with that transition?
■■ In addition, given that the transition to an automaker enterprise liability regime would almost certainly increase the
“experienced” price of autos and driving, how would lowincome families be expected to afford access to auto ownership, which has been shown to foster upward mobility?
■■

All of these are fair questions and would need to be considered
before auto enterprise liability were seriously considered.

